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Manufacturing has traditionally been regarded in the development literature as having 
special ‘growth-pulling’ or ‘growth-enhancing’ properties. The share of manufacturing 
in GDP has been declining slightly over time in South Africa, while that of services has 
been growing. This study focuses on the ‘Hirschmanian’ channels through which 
sectoral growth can lead or support aggregate economic growth, using input-output 
tables to investigate intersectoral linkages in the South African economy. 
Manufacturing is found to be especially important as a source of demand for the 
services sector and the rest of the economy through its strong backward linkages. This 
draws attention to possible negative implications of a decline in manufacturing on the 
South African economy. 
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1 Introduction 
Growth in South Africa has been stagnant for several decades, although it has picked up 
somewhat more recently. At a sectoral level, the performance of manufacturing has 
been rather poor, while services have been growing as a share of GDP. These changes 
in the sectoral structure of the economy are likely to have implications for economic 
growth, particularly in the medium- to long-term. Manufacturing is traditionally 
regarded (at least in the classical development and heterodox literature) as being an 
engine of growth. This would imply that an absolute or even relative decline in 
manufacturing would have deleterious consequences for sustainable growth.  
This study uses input-output data over time to analysis the relationship between the 
manufacturing and services sectors and between each of them and the rest of the 
economy. It is part of a larger project using various methods to analyse the contributions 
of manufacturing and services to growth and employment in South Africa. 
In Section 2 we discuss theoretical perspectives from the literature around the special 
properties of manufacturing and around changing relationships between manufacturing 
and services. Section 3 discusses ten channels through which growth in a sector of the 
economy can raise or support aggregate economic growth in the rest of an economy. 
Section 4 provides an overview of relevant empirical trends in the South African 
economy, with an emphasis on a comparison of the manufacturing and services sectors. 
Section 5 empirically investigates the linkages between the manufacturing and services 
sectors in South Africa and the contributions of each to overall growth through 
multiplier effects. Section 6 concludes.  
2  Sectoral composition and growth and development 
Kuznets analysed the structure of and changes in the economy in terms of the 
agricultural, manufacturing, and services sectors. The somewhat less ‘neutral’ 
conceptualization of the economy in ‘primary’, ‘secondary’ and ‘tertiary’ sectors is 
traced back to Fisher (1939), and was restated by Clark (1940), albeit with a slightly 
different meaning of the ‘tertiary’ sector. This developed into the Fisher-Clark ‘three-
stages’ theory of growth. 
The shift from agriculture to manufacturing is explained by three main factors, 
encompassing both the supply and demand sides. First, changes in comparative costs 
and differences in their respective rates of growth of productivity (the rate of growth of 
productivity in manufacturing being significantly higher, owing to factors such as 
economies of scale). Second, changes in preferences (towards manufactured goods) and 
income-elasticities of demand (those of manufactured commodities being higher than 
those of agricultural goods). Third, the impact of a changing international division of 
labour. Fourth, the increasing division of labour within an economy. Initially, an 
increase in agricultural productivity led on the demand side to higher income in 
agriculture, which increased the demand for manufactured goods, while on the supply 
side to an increase in the division of labour, towards manufacturing. Similar, but not 
identical, dynamics would subsequently be at work in economies’ shift towards 
services.   2
There has traditionally been a strong argument in branches of heterodox economics that 
there is a sector-specificity in the economic growth process.1 This implies that a unit of 
value added is not necessarily equivalent across sectors, notably in terms of its growth-
inducing effects. Such an approach can be distinguished from those parts of the growth 
literature that tend to see growth as sector-neutral (as well as activity-neutral in the 
traditional Solow-type growth models and some endogenous growth theories, or 
activity-specific such as in the new endogenous growth theories that emphasize the 
importance of R&D and human capital).2 
The classical development economics literature posits a strong relationship between 
changes in the sectoral composition of an economy and its rate of growth. The 
intersectoral reallocation of labour from low- to high-productivity activities is seen as 
central to increases in overall productivity in developing countries. Specifically, 
industrialization and the growth of manufacturing is the engine of technical change and 
economic growth. This differs from developed countries where technological 
innovation, rather than changes in the sectoral composition of the economy, is most 
important for raising aggregate productivity.  
In some sense Kaldor’s contribution might be regarded as formalizing and rationalizing 
the empirical regularities and stylized facts discussed by Kuznets and developed and 
tested by Chenery and Syrquin. To this Kaldor added an analysis of why manufacturing 
has such special qualities relevant for growth. The heterodox literature in the broad 
Kaldorian tradition3 has thus seen the manufacturing sector as being imbued with 
‘special characteristics’ that are not shared by the other sectors. This leads to the 
manufacturing sector being accorded a special place in understanding the causal 
relationships of the growth process, as well as suggesting that from a policy perspective 
there needs to be a particular focus on the manufacturing sector.  
The special characteristics typically attributed to the manufacturing sector include: 
•  The idea that manufacturing growth ‘pulls along’ economic growth in ways that 
growth in other sectors of the economy does not. 
•  Dynamic economies of scale in manufacturing, such that the growth of productivity 
in manufacturing is higher the higher the growth in manufacturing output.4 This is 
related to the notion that ‘learning by doing’ is more important in industry than in 
agriculture or services. Learning by doing, innovation, and intersectoral linkages 
thus render overall productivity growth endogenous to growth in dynamic 
manufacturing sectors. This of course means that expanding the manufacturing 
sector would raise manufacturing (and non-manufacturing) productivity.  
                                                 
1  See for instance Thirlwall (2003). 
2  See Palma (2005). 
3  Others associated with this type of approach include Young, Verdoorn, Kalecki, Hirschman, 
Prebisch, Pasinetti, and Thirlwall. 
4  However, note also that in an open economy, economies of scale may be associated with falling 
prices, depending in part on demand conditions.   3
•  The argument that most technological change occurs in the manufacturing sector. 
Further, that technological change that does occur in the rest of the economy 
actually tends to be diffused out from the manufacturing sector, in part through the 
use of higher productivity manufacturing inputs in the ‘production’ process of the 
rest of the economy. These kinds of technological-change externalities are one form 
of Hirschman-type intersectoral linkages. 
•  That manufacturing is critical to alleviating balance of payments constraints that can 
impose a ‘stop-go’ pattern on developing countries’ growth and hence to supporting 
sustained high growth rates, particularly in the absence of a strong primary 
commodity export sector with stable and favourable terms of trade. 
Concerns have arisen in this type of literature in recent years, although more broadly as 
well, concerning deindustrialization and premature deindustrialization in particular.5 By 
way of stylized facts, not only have levels of manufacturing employment corresponding 
to particular levels of GDP fallen, but the turning point of GDP per capita at which 
manufacturing employment as a percentage of total employment has tended to decline 
as well. Further, trade liberalization appears to have accelerated deindustrialization in a 
number of emerging economies. This has raised concerns that such economies may not 
be able to take advantage of the apparent broader benefits of manufacturing growth as 
much as they could have. 
3  Channels of sectoral contribution to overall growth 
This section aims to provide a conceptual framework for thinking through the various 
ways in which growth in a sector of the economy can contribute to broader economic 
growth, over and above the sector’s direct contribution to total output through its own 
value added (or its own direct contribution to economic growth through growth in its 
own value added). If an increase in the value added by a sector increases GDP by a 
factor exceeding that direct increase in value added, this would indicate additional 
indirect growth-inducing processes at work. It is these processes that are further 
discussed below. The object of this discussion is not to suggest ways in which growth 
can be enhanced; it is to discuss the channels through which growth in a sector can 
induce or support higher aggregate growth. 
Sectoral growth can bring about economic growth (over and above the actual sectoral 
growth itself) by feeding into any of four basic sources of growth: net investment, 
technological change, the reallocation of resources to achieve higher output, and an 
increased level of resource utilization. The first two of these sources of growth relate to 
shifting the production frontier outwards, whilst the latter two deal with obtaining 
higher levels of output for any given production frontier. 
Certain characteristics of a sector and the way in which it articulates with the rest of the 
economy affect the extent to which growth in that sector contributes to overall growth. 
Below I outline ten mechanisms through which sectoral growth can lead to net overall 
growth over and above that sectoral growth. These channels are: backward linkages; 
forward linkages; compositional effects; specialization; trade; employment; innovation, 
                                                 
5  See for instance Blackaby (1978), and Rowthorn and Wells (1987), Rowthorn and Ramaswamy 
(1999), Palma (2008), and Tregenna (2008).   4
technological progress and productivity growth; savings; fiscal; and institutional 
mechanisms.  
First, a sector’s backward linkages to the rest of the domestic economy create additional 
demand for the output of those upstream sectors. This additional demand may induce 
increased upstream investment and/or an increased level of capacity utilization 
(including employment creation) upstream, as well as possibly promoting upstream 
technological upgrading. The strength of a sector’s contribution to growth through this 
mechanism would be determined by its degree of upstream vertical integration with the 
rest of the domestic economy. The lower a sector’s value added as a share of its output, 
the higher the proportion of intermediate inputs. The higher the proportion of these 
intermediate inputs that are domestically sourced, the higher is the sector’s degree of 
backward integration. Further, the overall effects on the economy would also depend on 
the nature of the sectors to which a sector is backwardly linked – their own backward 
linkages, and so on.  
Second, a sector’s forward linkages to the rest of the economy can contribute to growth 
through impact on downstream sectors. If a sector’s growth lowers the cost of its output 
which goes into intermediate inputs for downstream sectors, and to the extent that this 
lowers the cost faced by those downstream sectors below what it paid previously 
(whether for domestically sourced or imported inputs), this can result in growth-
inducing downstream effects. These could include downstream investment, 
technological upgrading, or increased productivity and resource utilization (again 
including employment). The strength of this mechanism for a given sector depends on 
its degree of downstream vertical integration with the domestic economy. This would 
obviously be higher for sectors the lower the proportion of final output in their total 
output. Total forward linkages of a sector would also depend on the nature of its 
downstream sectors and their own forward linkages. Both of these first two mechanisms 
through which sectoral growth may contribute to economic growth – the effects of 
backward and forward linkages – are Hirschman-type production linkages.6 
The third mechanism, of a change in the sectoral composition of the economy, is 
relevant when the existing sectoral composition of the economy is not ‘optimal’ for 
growth. This optimality could of course have different meanings, but would typically be 
thought of in terms of productivity. Growth in a sector with higher (marginal) 
productivity than the economy-wide average would, ceteris paribus, raise aggregate 
productivity, even if the expansion in that sector came at the expense of other sectors 
with lower average productivity. This mechanism can thus contribute to growth in terms 
of reallocating resources to achieve a higher output.  
Fourth, sectoral growth can lead to increased division of labour and specialization in the 
economy. As a sector grows and develops, ‘non-core’ activities are more likely to be 
outsourced (either within the sector or to other sectors). The tendency towards such 
increased division of labour and specialization – which is found throughout economic 
history – tends to be associated with higher level of productivity and higher rates of 
growth. Growth-induced division of labour and specialization increases the possibilities 
for benefiting from economies of scale and increasing returns, which can raise overall 
growth. For example, the hiving off of activities such as data processing, transport, or 
                                                 
6  The strength of these two linkages channels are measured in section 5 of this paper.   5
recruitment to specialized firms can allow these activities to be undertaken at higher 
rates of productivity than when undertaken within the original firm. Specialization can 
thus feed into higher aggregate growth through a reallocation of activities as well as 
through progressive technological change.  
Fifth, a sector may contribute to growth through trade. The first issue in this regard is 
whether exports of the sector exceed import penetration in that sector, putting the sector 
in a net balance of payments surplus position. The second factor is the import 
dependence of the sector. Even a sector that is a net exporter (in the sense of more final 
output of the sector being exported than imported) may be a net user of foreign 
exchange if it is highly dependent on imported intermediate inputs. Considering these 
two aspects jointly, if a sector is a net generator of foreign exchange, it may contribute 
to growth, as the foreign exchange surplus can increase investment in the economy as 
well as providing the foreign exchange needed for imported inputs into other productive 
activities in the economy. By mitigating balance of payments constraints on other 
sectors of the economy, sectoral growth that generates net foreign exchange can 
facilitate a reallocation of resources across the economy in a manner that supports 
higher growth.7  
The sixth channel through which a sector can contribute to economic growth is through 
growth-inducing or growth-complementing externalities of employment in the sector. 
There are a number of ways through which such effects can be realized. First, and 
perhaps most important here, wages paid are a component of domestic demand. Growth 
in a sector can increase the wage bill through an increase in average remuneration per 
worker in that sector and/or through an increase in employment in the sector. A higher 
wage bill in the sector can have growth-inducing effects by increasing domestic demand 
and thereby raising the level of resource utilization. This may also induce increased 
investment. This is an important instance of a ‘Keynesian-type’ demand multiplier. 
Second, the engagement of people of work as opposed to them being unemployed can 
preserve developed skills (both through on-the-job training as well as learning-by-
doing) which can be positive for the current and future productivity of the economy. 
This can be considered a form of technological change, which can contribute to higher 
levels of aggregate growth. Third, higher employment can contribute to the fiscus 
through taxes on wages and incomes, as well as (to a limited extent given our non-
comprehensive social security system) reducing the burden of social security and health 
and education co-payments on the state. This can potentially contribute to growth 
through a more productive reallocation of resources to achieve higher output. Fourth, in 
a less tangible way, higher employment can generate broader positive externalities 
through contributions to social stability and cohesion, lower crime, etc. This could 
potentially contribute to growth through an improved environment for investment, 
increases in total factor productivity, a reallocation of resources to achieve higher 
output, and an increased level of resource allocation. These are four channels through 
which additional employment generated through sectoral growth can have broader 
                                                 
7  Many growth theories also emphasize the ‘supply-side’ role of international trade in economic 
growth. According to these theories, the crucial ‘incentives’ for technological change and productive 
efficiency (not just in the traded sectors but in the overall economy) arise from competitive trade 
pressures. This is relevant both for exports having to compete in international markets and for 
domestic activities having to deal with the competitive pressure of imported substitutes. Augmented 
Solow-type models have gone as far as introducing exports as a ‘factor of production’ in their 
production functions (alongside capital and labour).    6
growth-inducing effects. These mechanisms are particularly important given the depth 
of our unemployment crisis. 
In empirically investigating the strength of these employment-related growth-inducing 
or growth-complementing effects, both the direct and indirect employment intensities of 
a sector are relevant (the latter best quantified through employment multipliers). The 
nature of marginal employment in a sector is also relevant in assessing the growth-
inducing potential of the employment channel. One specific consideration here, which 
relates to the first of the employment-associated growth channels discussed above, is the 
composition of a sector’s wage bill and specifically of the increase in the wage bill 
associated with sectoral growth. For instance, for a given wage bill, employment of a 
greater number of low-paid jobs is likely to have a higher positive effect on domestic 
demand given the higher propensity to consume domestically produced goods and 
services among low-income earners. 
The seventh mechanism through which sectoral growth can contribute to higher overall 
growth is through innovation, technological progress, and productivity growth. This is 
in fact one of the four basic sources of growth discussed above. First, innovation and 
technological progress ‘internal’ to the sector can raise overall productivity and 
competitiveness. Second, to the extent to which this innovation is transferable, it can 
raise productivity and competitiveness in other sectors. Third, especially for the ICT 
sectors (as well as others sharing similar characteristics or roles), they are a direct input 
into the productivity and competitiveness of those downstream sectors. Fourth, to the 
extent that productivity is endogenous to output, growth in a sector can raise overall 
productivity through economies of scale. In addition to acting as a direct source of 
growth, technological progress in a sector may also be favourable for investment – 
either within the sector or in other sectors.  
The eighth channel is through savings. Surplus in a sector – if retained domestically – 
can contribute to aggregate savings which can feed into investment elsewhere in the 
economy, providing the basis for accumulation and growth. However, in evaluating 
whether or not a sector is a net saver, it is necessary to consider both its direct and 
indirect contributions to saving. First, a sector can save directly, which can be used for 
investment in the economy as a whole. Secondly, the sector can give rise to incomes 
that go to agents that have high savings rates. In this regard, comparing two sectors that 
have the same direct savings rate, if one pays out incomes to agents that result in higher 
savings by those agents – either due to a higher payout or that the agents have a higher 
rate of savings than those paid out by a different sector – then that sector will have a 
higher indirect savings rate.8 
The ninth mechanism through which sectoral growth can contribute to additional 
growth is through the net increase in its fiscal contribution associated with the sectoral 
growth, that is, a sector’s tax payments, net of subsidies to the sector. This can 
                                                 
8  This is not to suggest that it is necessarily a negative characteristic of a sector to be a net dissaver, i.e. 
a net investor. A dynamic sector with high growth and profit prospects would be likely to attract 
investment from elsewhere in the economy and to be a net dissaver. It simply means that such a 
sector would not be contributing to additional overall growth through this particular mechanism. One 
can also note the possible trade-off between a sector’s contribution to savings and its role in 
stimulating demand for intermediate goods from other sectors, in the sense that savings is a form of 
‘leakage’.   7
contribute to growth through a reallocation of resources insofar as the marginal public 
expenditure has higher growth-inducing qualities than the marginal private expenditure. 
A sector’s potential growth contribution through this channel would depend on its net 
fiscal contribution, which would be determined by the effective tax paid minus any 
subsidies received from the state.  
Finally, the tenth set of mechanisms through which sectoral growth can lead to or 
support aggregate growth over and above that sectoral growth, is institutional channels. 
Broadly speaking, growth in particular sectors can be conducive to particular 
institutional structures, which could have differential effects in inducing or supporting 
overall growth. For example, minerals-exporters tend to generate specific types of 
institutions, as distinct from agricultural exporters, as distinct from light-manufacturing 
exporters (sectoral structure is of course merely one of the many determinants of 
institutional structure). These different institutional structures would tend to have 
varying growth-inducing and growth-complementing capacities. If growth in a sector 
leads or supports the development of ‘progressive’ institutions, this can contribute to 
overall growth above the sectoral growth as these institutions can support growth 
elsewhere in the economy. 
A further aspect of this ‘institutional’ channel relates to firm size. Barriers to entry, 
particularly in internationalized markets, mean that a large firm size is often required to 
competitively break into particular sectors, which also tend to be the higher-productivity 
sectors. If growth in a sector, combined with appropriate policy interventions, facilitates 
the growth of large competitive firms with the resources to break into international 
competition, and compete not only in the original sector but in other sectors as well, this 
has the potential for contributing to higher net growth. (Of course, there are also 
problems associated with large firms, particularly in the context of a monopolistic 
industrial structure, and hence the overall effects are ambiguous and context-specific.) 
Summing up this discussion, growth in any sector could potentially have growth-
inducing or growth-supporting effects through any or all of the nine channels discussed 
above. However, the strength and relative importance of these mechanisms would differ 
between sectors. And of course, the overall growth-inducing effects of sectoral growth 
would vary across sectors. One of the primary objectives of this paper is to investigate 
empirically the strengths of the various effects, and the overall growth-inducing effects 
of sectoral growth, across sectors of the economy and in particular comparing between 
the manufacturing and service sectors. 
4 Empirical  background 
4.1 International  context 
This section contextualizes the sectoral structure of South Africa’s economy and 
changes in terms of international patterns of sectoral structure for countries at different 
levels of economic development. The shares of manufacturing and services respectively 
in each of value added and employment are regressed in each instance on the level of 
per capita income. The purpose is to understand sectoral shares in terms of level of 
economic development, the nature of the relationship, and to consider South Africa’s 
sectoral shares relative to what would be expected for our level of income per capita.   8
All regressions are based on a uniform sample of 84 countries.9 Data is from 2003. In 
each case various linear and non-linear specifications were tested, and those presented 
here had the best fit in the case of each explanatory variable. All parameters are 
statistically significant at the 1 per cent level (except for the squared term in the 
manufacturing value added regression which is significant at the 2 per cent level). The 
regressions are of course underspecified, but the purpose is to understand the basic 
relationships between economic development and sector shares, rather than to fully 
explain the determination of sectoral shares. Finally, note that these regressions are 
static takes on the relationship between economic development and sector shares, as 
they are cross-sectional in nature. 
Both manufacturing value added and manufacturing employment show the typical 
inverted-U as discussed in the literature, as can be seen in Figures 1 and 2. However, the 
fit is very weak in the case of the share of manufacturing share in GDP, where there is a 
high degree of heterogeneity for any given level of GDP (particularly at middle-upper 
levels of income per capita).10 The estimated coefficients are nevertheless highly 
significant. 
In manufacturing South Africa has a higher share of manufacturing value added than 
would be expected (19.44 per cent as compared to an expected 17.90 per cent) but a 
lower share of manufacturing employment than would be expected (14.1 per cent as 
compared to an expected 16.11 per cent). This is distinct from both services and 
agriculture, and suggests that the ‘problem’ is specifically with manufacturing 
employment in South Africa. 
In services, a positive relationship is found between income per capita and both services 
share of GDP and services share of employment – see Figures 3 and 4. For both value 
added and employment, the share of services in South Africa is significantly above the 
level that would be expected for its level of income per capita. South Africa’s actual 
share of services in GDP is 64.75 per cent, well above the expected level of 57.30 per 
cent. A very similar picture emerges in terms of employment: the actual share of 
services in total employment in South Africa is 65.1 per cent, relative to an expected 
level of 57.02 per cent. 
It is striking that South Africa lies above the linear trendline for both GDP versus 
services share of GDP and for GDP versus services share of total employment. This is 
particularly noteworthy given that South Africa comes from a background of minerals 
and heavy industry. On the one hand, from a simple compositional approach, South 
Africa’s position above the trendline is surprising given that a share of value added and 
of employment would be accounted for my minerals and mineral-linked activities, 
 
                                                 
9  This is in order to avoid non-comparability arising from selection bias associated with different types 
of countries having data for different sectors. However, the sample is nevertheless somewhat biased 
owing to uneven data availability. Less developed countries (sub-Saharan African countries in 
particular) are underrepresented. 
10  Note that the low R2 increases considerably (with the parameters remaining highly significant) if 
outliers are excluded, if more countries are included in the sample (i.e. including countries that do not 
have available data for the full set of regressions), and if a dummy is included for commodity-
producing countries.   9
Figure 1: Cross-country relationship between 
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which would not be the case for countries without such a background. On this basis it 
might have been expected that South Africa would have a relatively low share of 
services (especially in value added) for its level of economic development, and its actual 
position in the scatterplots might be surprising. 
On the other hand, from a dynamic perspective of the economy’s developmental 
trajectory, South Africa’s apparently ‘disproportionately large’ services sector might be 
a symptom of a distorted development path and underdevelopment of a manufacturing 
sector, notably of light manufacturing. South Africa could be considered to have earlier 
‘leapfrogged’ from a minerals and resource-based economy to capital-intensive heavy 
industry, without going through a period of development of labour-intensive light 
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form of premature deindustrialization – without ever having industrialized fully or 
derived full benefits from that.11  
This would be consistent with the result discussed above that South Africa has a larger 
share of value added and of employment accounted for by services than is typical for 
economies at our stage of development. Further, the finding that South Africa’s 
manufacturing value added as a share of GDP is higher than would be expected whereas 
the opposite result emerges for manufacturing employment could be consistent with the 
underdevelopment of light manufacturing in particular (although it is also likely to be 
related to political economy and labour market factors specific to South Africa). South 
Africa’s manufacturing employment also appears to have peaked at both a lower share 
of employment and at a lower level of per capita income (i.e. earlier) than was the 
international norm of the turning point for country’s manufacturing share of 
employment.12 This again points to evidence of premature deindustrialization.  
It is also worth noting that, according to theories of comparative advantage, countries 
with relatively high endowments of skilled labour, and to a lesser extent of capital, and 
relatively poor natural resource endowments, would (and even should) export more 
services than those relatively abundant in land and natural resources or lacking in skills. 
This would suggest that South Africa would not necessarily be a ‘natural’ net services-
exporter. However, such comparative advantages are of course not cast in stone, but are 
partially endogenous and subject to policy interventions.  
4.2  South Africa: overview of key empirical trends 
This section examines various trends in the economy of relevance to this paper, 
specifically comparing the manufacturing and private services sectors. Data is derived 
from the South African Standardized Industry Database (SASID) unless otherwise 
indicated. For employment trends, or trends derived using employment data (that is, 
capital intensity and labour productivity), results are presented using both SASID and 
LFS employment data.13 
First, as can be seen from Figure 5, services account for a large and increasing share of 
total value added. The services sector excluding general government accounts for 54 per 
cent of value added in 2007, up from 38 per cent in 1970. Manufacturing’s share of 
value added has been fairly stagnant, although the share peaked in the early 1980s, with 
a slight but steady downward trend since then. 
                                                 
11  However, because of global production and trade trends and the context of South Africa’s trade 
liberalization, it would be challenging at this point to move into sectors of light manufacturing 
production which have been ‘underdeveloped’ up to this point and in which we are not currently 
competitive, apart from developing the capacity to at least meet domestic demand. 
12  This is not shown in the charts, but is based on the fact that the highest shares that South African 
manufacturing reached both as in terms of GDP and in terms of employment are lower than had been 
the case for many comparable countries. 
13  Both of these sources of employment data have limitations. The recent SASID data is based primarily 
on the Survey of Employment and Earnings (SEE), hence it probably underestimates employment 
especially in the services sector given that it is derived from data provided by firms and the sample 
excludes small firms.     11
Figure 5: Value added (at basic prices) 1970-2007 (R billion) 
 
 
3-year moving averages 
 
Figure 6: Employment (SASID) 1970-2007 (millions) 
 
 
3-year moving averages 
In terms of employment (see Figure 6), services have shown significant and steady 
growth throughout, both in absolute terms and as a percentage of total employment. 
Manufacturing employment varies between about 1.1 million and 1.7 million over the 
period; as a share of total employment declining from a peak of 17.4 per cent in the 
early 1980s and a share of around 15 per cent up until the mid 1990s, to just 12.2 per 
cent at present. We also show employment trends for 2001-07 based on LFS data, as 
shown in Figure 7.   12
Figure 7: Formal employment (LFS data) 2001-07 
 
3-year moving averages 
The share of manufacturing in total fixed capital stock (not shown here) has actually 
been rising, with the capital intensification of this sector. The share of capital stock in 
services has dropped slightly, although it is still close to half of total fixed capital stock. 
Half of the capital stock of services is in finance and business services, and another 30 
per cent in transport and storage. 
Figures 8 and 9 summarize trends in value added, labour productivity and employment, 
for the manufacturing and (private) services sectors, over the period 1970-2007. Figure 
8 uses SASID data and shows the trends from 1970-2007, while Figure 9 uses LFS data 
and is limited to the period 2001-07. In addition to the earlier discussion of trends in 
these variables separately, the examination of these together can yield additional 
insights concerning changes in employment. Of course, given that growth in 
employment is simply the difference between growth in value added and growth in 
productivity, conclusions cannot necessarily be drawn about causal relationships. 
Looking at the entire period from 1970 onwards (using SASID data), services show 
fairly steady growth throughout, without clear changes in patterns over the entire period. 
The growth in services employment is ‘explained’ (in a narrow mathematical sense) by 
the much faster rate of growth of value added over the rate of growth in productivity. 
Given that this data may undermeasure employment and services employment in 
particular, this could mean that productivity and the rise in productivity is overstated, 
especially for services. In the manufacturing sector, on the other hand, since about 1990 
value added has risen (although at a slower pace than in services) but employment has 
fallen, and thus we see rising productivity (at a faster rate than in services). The 
differences between the two sectors are starkest since the early 1990s.   13
Figure 8: Value added, labour productivity and employment in manufacturing and services, 
1970-2007 (SASID employment data) 
 
 
3-year moving averages; ln scale. 
 
Figure 9: Value added, labour productivity and employment in manufacturing and services, 
2001-07 (LFS employment data) 
 
2-year moving averages; ln scale.   14
LFS data (Figure 9, for 2001 onwards) show increasing employment in services and 
fairly stable (or stagnant) employment in manufacturing. The more robust employment 
performance suggested by the LFS data (relative to the SASID data) result in lower 
apparent increases in productivity. 
Figures 10 and 11 show subsectors’ contribution to value added and employment, in 
manufacturing and services respectively. A sector falling on the diagonal dotted line 
would make an equal contribution to output and employment in the economy; a sector 
falling above the line would contribute relatively more to employment than to output; 
and a sector falling below the line would be contributing relatively more to output than 
to employment. The relative size of sectors is of course evident from their positions.14 
The object of this exercise is to examine sectors’ differential importance in terms of 
value added and employment, and further to investigate whether different patterns are 
evident for the manufacturing and services sectors. Although the picture is mixed, on 
balance it appears that services sectors tend to be relatively more important from an 
employment perspective, while manufacturing sectors tend to be relatively more 
important from a value added perspective.15  
45 per cent of exports are accounted for by manufacturing, up from a quarter in 1970 
(when gold was far more important); see Figures 12 and 13. The share of services has 
risen gradually, up to 19 per cent in 2007 – far below services’ share of output or value 
added (as would be expected). 
5  Sectoral linkages and multipliers 
5.1  Relevance of intersectoral linkages 
Forward and backward linkages between a sector and the rest of the domestic economy 
were identified (in section 3 of this paper) as two of the channels through which growth 
in a sector can contribute to higher levels of overall economic growth, over and above 
the direct contribution of the sector. This analysis quantifies various direct and indirect 
backward and forward linkages and multipliers of each sector and tracks the changes 
over time. This yields interesting results in terms of the relative strength of these 
linkages, particularly comparing the manufacturing and services sectors. 
Backward linkages create additional demand for the output of upstream sectors. This 
additional demand can contribute to growth through increased upstream investment 
and/or capacity utilization, as well as possibly contributing to upstream technological 
upgrading. How much a given sector contributes to growth through this channel 
depends on the strength of its upstream vertical integration with the domestic economy, 
as well as indirectly through the degree of integration of those upstream sectors to 
which it is linked.  
                                                 
14  As appropriate and where their shares are very small, some sectors are clustered for heuristic 
purposes. 
15  This of course only shows sectors’ direct contribution to value added and employment. The 
discussion of sectoral multipliers in section 5 will also factor in indirect contributions.   15
Figure 10: Share of value added and employment by manufacturing sector, 2005 
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Figure 11: Share of value added and employment by services sector, 2005 
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Figure 12: Exports of goods and services 1970-2007 (R million) 
 
3-year moving averages 
 
Figure 13: Exports as % of total output 1970-2007 
 
3-year moving averages   17
Forward linkages with downstream sectors of the domestic economy can also be a 
channel through which sectoral growth can raise overall growth. The primary 
mechanisms through which this can be realized are lower costs of intermediate inputs 
into downstream sectors, which can induce higher investment and/or capacity 
utilization, technological upgrading, and increased productivity in those downstream 
sectors (as well as potentially indirectly into other sectors with which those downstream 
sectors are integrated). Hirschman also argues that a sector whose output can be used as 
intermediate inputs in other sectors will result in attempts to employ these products in 
new activities.  
Differential forward and backward linkages between sectors, and the potential of these 
linkages to contribute to higher economic growth, suggest that an unbalanced growth 
path in which sectors with high linkages are prioritized – not that this is the only 
relevant criterion of course – could potentially reach higher growth than a balanced 
growth path.  
Of course, not all linkages of similar size are equivalent, either analytically or in terms 
of policy implications. A high linkage coefficient does not necessarily indicate 
causality. Jones (1976) makes a useful distinction in this regard between permissive 
linkages and causal linkages. For instance, high forward linkages from sectors such as 
communications or electricity do not necessarily suggest that an expansion of these 
sectors would lead to the growth of downstream industries. On the contrary, these high 
linkages may actually reflect causality from the demand generated by downstream 
industries. Even so, high linkages in such a situation do indicate the importance of the 
upstream sector, as any failure on its part to meet downstream demand (assuming that 
this could not be substituted by imported inputs) would constrain downstream growth.  
Hirschmanian-type production linkages, both backward and forward, are part of the 
‘sectoral specificity’ of growth discussed earlier in this paper. They are often more 
strongly associated with the manufacturing sector, being considered part of the ‘special 
properties’ of manufacturing that accord it a privileged role in the growth process.  
5.2 Some  methodological  issues 
The methodology used to calculate the various linkages and multipliers is shown in 
Appendix 1. Here we simply highlight a particular issue around imported intermediates 
– which this study takes account of, unlike most similar work in the literature – as well 
as pointing out some caveats relevant to this type of analysis. 
Using the total flow matrix to calculate linkages means that no distinction is made 
between inputs sourced domestically or abroad, and hence no distinction between the 
potential stimulation of upstream industries in South Africa or in other countries from 
which inputs are imported. Failure to distinguish these – as is often the case in analysis 
of intersectoral linkages – is thus very problematic. For instance, a backward linkage 
between two sectors that appears to show significant ‘pulling power’ from the 
downstream to the upstream sector may be misleading if a large proportion of the 
upstream inputs are in fact imported, with little stimulatory effect on the domestic 
economy. 
When the difference between ‘domestic’ and ‘worldwide’ backward linkages arises 
because of differential resource endowments or because of differential capacities that   18
are unlikely to converge in the short- to medium-term (or at least over the period of 
interest for the analysis), then ‘worldwide’ linkages over and above the domestic ones 
are irrelevant to Hirschmanian growth processes. On the other hand, insofar as the gap 
between domestic and worldwide backward linkages is due to differences in the stage of 
development or to differential capacities which are subject to ‘catch-up’, then the gap 
actually points to the potential for import substitution. Thus, use of the domestic flow 
matrix is relevant to ex post analysis of what has actually happened, as well as the 
relevance of this for what is likely to happen in the future period of interest. The total 
flow matrix is relevant to the ‘upper bound’ of backward linkages (if all imports could 
be substituted by domestically produced goods, and in the absence of changes in the 
degree of intersectoral integration).16  
In order to take into account this issue of imported intermediate inputs, for each of the 
sets of linkages discussed below (and shown in Appendix 2), the results are analysed 
using both the total flow matrix (which includes imported intermediates) as well as the 
adjusted matrix (excluding these imported intermediates). 
A caveat to be noted is that all multipliers discussed here are actually based on average 
and not marginal analysis. Any interpretation regarding what might happen if, for 
example, final demand for a certain sector rose, should be treated with caution. Such 
projections are most likely to be accurate for relatively small increases in the short- to 
medium-term. For example, a huge increase (decrease) in demand for the output of a 
given sector would not necessarily be associated with the same linkages as currently 
characterize the sector. This is especially pertinent in a relatively open economy, as 
expanded demand can be met through imports in greater proportion than is the case 
initially. To the extent that this is the case, it implies that the analysis might overstate 
the stimulatory effects on the domestic economy of an increase in demand. Further, this 
is likely to be stronger for manufacturing than for services, as tradables can generally be 
more easily substituted with imports. A final caveat at this point is that, given that these 
calculations are not integrated in an economy-wide model, no consideration is given to 
supply constraints or to macroeconomic considerations. 
5.3 Backward  linkages 
This section quantifies and discusses the relative strength of both backward and forward 
linkages between sectors, with a focus on the manufacturing and services sectors. This 
empirically investigates the issues discussed earlier at a theoretical level concerning the 
relative interdependence of sectors, with particular attention to the manufacturing and 
services sectors. The methodology used to calculate the various linkages and multipliers 
is shown in Appendix 1, and the tables of results are shown in Appendix 2. In this 
section the meaning of each of the measures is explained, and the key results concerning 
the linkages between the manufacturing and services sectors are highlighted. 
First, we look at backward linkages in order to evaluate how ‘dependent’ one sector is 
on upstream sectors (suppliers) for its inputs. The upstream linkages coefficient of 
                                                 
16  A further exercise (not undertaken here) would be to identify, by sector, imported intermediates that 
can potentially and within the timeframe of interest be substituted by domestically produced goods, 
and on that basis to estimate a ‘domestic potential’ flow matrix from which technical coefficients 
could be derived.   19
sector j with respect to sector i measures the percentage of sector i’s intermediate inputs 
purchased from sector j.  
Of the intermediate inputs into manufacturing 25.3 per cent come from services (of 
which the bulk comes from trade and from finance). Of the intermediate inputs into 
services 24.7 per cent come from manufacturing. The transport and community social 
and personal services subsectors of services are particularly dependent on 
manufacturing for their intermediate inputs. In this first measure, manufacturing and 
services are thus roughly equally dependent on each other for their intermediate inputs 
as a share of their total intermediate inputs. 
These linkages can be re-examined excluding imported intermediates. As discussed 
earlier, this is important as backward linkages through imported intermediates would 
not have much stimulatory effect on the domestic economy (at least through the 
Hirschmanian-type channels under discussion here). Of all domestically produced 
intermediates into manufacturing 31.4 per cent are purchased from the services sector 
(especially the trade and finance subsectors of services). On the other hand, 18.6 per 
cent of all domestically sourced intermediate inputs into services come from 
manufacturing. When imported intermediates are excluded, manufacturing is thus seen 
to be more ‘dependent’ on services inputs than the other way around (whereas they 
appeared roughly equal when looking at all intermediate inputs). Of course, the 
converse dimension of this ‘dependence’ of manufacturing for inputs from services is 
the demand generated by manufacturing for the output of the services sector. 
The above calculations of backward linkages measured intermediate inputs from 
upstream sectors as a share of total intermediate inputs into each downstream sector. 
Next, we measure intermediate inputs from sector i into sector j as a share of the total 
inputs into sector j (that is, not only intermediate inputs from the same and other sectors 
but also remuneration, net operating surplus, consumption of fixed capital, and taxes 
and subsidies). Of the total inputs into manufacturing 18.7 per cent come from services, 
while conversely 11.8 per cent of the total inputs into services come from 
manufacturing. In this respect, manufacturing has greater ‘backward dependence’ on 
services for its inputs than the other way around. When these figures are adjusted to 
exclude imported intermediates, the backward link from manufacturing to services is 
slightly brought down to 18.2 per cent whereas the backward link from services to 
manufacturing is brought down more to 8 per cent. (The greater drop in the latter case is 
due to the higher share of imports in the intermediate inputs used in manufacturing than 
in services.) Excluding imported inputs, the greater ‘backward dependence’ of 
manufacturing on service inputs is thus underlined. This means that manufacturing uses 
relatively more inputs from services than the other way around. 
Next, backward linkages are weighted according to the size of each sector (the relative 
size of each input sector i). The weighted backward dependence of manufacturing on 
services is 0.65 (0.69 excluding intermediate inputs), while the weighted backward 
dependence of services on manufacturing is 0.54 (0.40 excluding intermediate inputs). 
Relative to the sizes of the two sectors, while manufacturing is still disproportionately 
‘dependent’ on services for its inputs, the difference is not as great as in the unweighted 
figures.  
In the final part of the analysis of backward linkages, we factor in both direct and 
indirect linkages through the input inverse (sometimes referred to as the Leontief   20
inverse). This is the key measure of the strength of total backward linkages. The input 
inverse shows the inputs from sector i that would be required (both directly and 
indirectly) for sector j to meet one additional unit of final demand. An additional unit of 
final demand for manufacturing output would require an additional 0.65 units of 
services. On the other hand, an additional unit of final demand for services output would 
require an additional 0.35 units of manufacturing. This asymmetry is somewhat closed 
when imported intermediate inputs are excluded, although manufacturing is still more 
‘dependent’ on services in terms of backward linkages than the other way around: a unit 
of final demand for manufacturing output would require 0.46 units of inputs from 
services while a unit of final demand for services output would require a 0.19 units of 
inputs from manufacturing.  
For the economy as a whole, an additional unit of final demand for manufacturing 
would require an additional 2.9 units of output (2.1 when import adjusted). An 
additional unit of final demand for services would have a weaker stimulatory effect on 
the economy as a whole: 2.1 units of additional output (or 1.8 when import adjusted). 
This is a central result, which suggests that a stimulus to manufacturing would have 
greater multiplier effects on the economy than an equal stimulus to services.  
Disaggregating the results to take account of heterogeneity within broad sectors, 
Figure 14 shows total backward linkages for subsectors of manufacturing and services 
in 2005. The black bars represent the totals, while the grey bars show the import-
adjusted figures. While there is considerable heterogeneity within each of the 
manufacturing and services sectors, what is most striking is the different ranges of the 
two sectors overall. With the exception of ‘other manufacturing’, even the services 
subsector with the highest overall backward linkages is still lower than the 
manufacturing subsector with the lowest. The differences between the manufacturing 
and services subsectors are not quite as stark when adjustments are made for imported 
intermediates (see the grey bars), yet the manufacturing subsectors still have stronger 
backward linkages than services, both overall and for most of the subsectors 
individually. 
5.4 Forward  linkages 
Having analysed backward linkages, we now turn to forward linkages. The object is to 
assess the relationship between each sector and its downstream (user) industries. Initial 
analysis suggests approximate symmetry between manufacturing and services although 
services is slightly more dependent on manufacturing as a source of demand than the 
other way around. Of the output of manufacturing that goes as intermediate inputs into 
other sectors, 23.2 per cent goes into services (i.e. services accounts for 23.2 per cent of 
the demand for intermediate outputs from manufacturing). The main component of this 
demand from services is from the transport, storage, and communication subsector of 
services. On the other hand, 24.2 per cent of the output from services that goes as 
intermediate inputs into other sectors, goes into manufacturing. As would be expected, 
these figures are only slightly affected by the exclusion of imported intermediates. 
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Figure 14: Total backward linkage vectors for manufacturing and services sub-sectors, 2005 
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However, since the proportion of output that goes to intermediate inputs varies 
significantly across sectors, this part of the analysis does not necessarily give a full 
picture of the importance of demand from each sector in the total demand for a sector’s 
output. We thus consider forward linkages in terms of total output, which is probably a 
more relevant measure. Tables A5 and A6 thus show the demand from each sector i for 
a sector j’s output, as a share of the total output of that sector j. (Of course the rows in 
this table no longer sum to 100 per cent, as not all the output of each sector goes into 
intermediate inputs – some is consumed, exported, and so on.) Of total manufacturing 
output 15.7 per cent goes into services (as intermediate input); whereas 14.1 per cent of 
total services output goes into manufacturing (as intermediate input) excluding imported 
intermediates, 10.7 per cent of total manufacturing output goes into services and 13.6 
per cent of total services output goes into manufacturing. In this sense services is more 
dependent on manufacturing as a source of demand than the other way around. 
One consideration to be borne in mind in comparing these coefficients between the 
manufacturing and services sectors is that by virtue of the fact that manufacturing is a 
secondary sector while services are tertiary, one might expect a greater proportion of 
manufacturing output to go into services than vice versa. This makes the greater 
dependence of services on manufacturing as a source of demand more noteworthy than 
would otherwise be the case. 
The relative size of sectors is also relevant to interpreting these results. For instance, 
were the manufacturing and services sector to have equally ‘strong’ forward linkages 
with the rest of the domestic economy, the downstream dependency ratios of services 
would still show up as much higher than those of manufacturing, simply by virtue of the 
fact that services’ share of the economy is several times as large as the share of 
manufacturing. We thus also calculate the weighted downstream dependency 
coefficients. 
When weighted according to sector size, the importance of manufacturing as a source of 
demand for the output of the services sector is 0.65, whereas the importance of services 
as a source of demand for manufacturing is 0.54. This indicates that, even more when 
adjusted for relative sector size, manufacturing is more important as a source of demand 
for services than the other way around. This asymmetry is heightened when imported 
intermediates are excluded: the weighted downstream dependence of manufacturing on 
services is 0.69 compared to 0.4 for services on manufacturing. 
Finally, we consider not only direct but also indirect linkages through the output inverse 
and total forward linkage vector. A one unit increase in primary input into 
manufacturing would need an additional 0.46 (0.25 when import adjusted) units of 
services in order to fully utilize it, including both direct and indirect intersectoral 
linkages. An additional unit of primary input into services would need an additional 
0.49 (0.34 when import adjusted) units of manufacturing production in order to fully 
utilize this initial increase. This suggests stronger forward linkages from services to 
manufacturing than the other way around. 
In terms of economy-wide total forward linkages, an additional unit of primary input 
into manufacturing would need an additional 2.7 units of total production in order to 
fully utilize it (1.9 when import-adjusted) while an additional unit of primary input into 
services would need an additional 2.4 units of total production in order to fully utilize it 
(2.1 when import-adjusted). These figures are of a roughly similar order of magnitude   23
when comparing manufacturing and services. However, the policy implications of these 
figures are not as strong as in the case of the total backward linkages, which show the 
multiplier potential of the different sectors. 
5.5  Trends over time 
All of the measures discussed here of various forward and backward linkages were also 
calculated on a historical basis from 1970 onwards (in current terms) and from 1980 
onwards (in constant terms). Figures 15-18 show the trends in direct and total backward 
and forward linkages over time (in constant terms). Both the direct and total backward 
linkages of manufacturing are significantly stronger than those of services for the entire 
period (although in the case of the direct linkages, services appears to be slightly 
converging towards manufacturing over time). The stronger backward linkages of 
manufacturing indicate the importance of manufacturing as a source of demand in the 
economy and in terms of ‘growth-pulling’.  
Looking at forward linkages over time, a similar pattern is evident between direct and 
indirect linkages. Interestingly, services overtakes manufacturing in the strength of 
forward linkages in the mid-1990s. There is also greater volatility in the trends for 
manufacturing than for services, which may be related to the relative tradability of the 
two sectors. It is not clear at this point as to why the backward linkages of 
manufacturing and services track each other fairly evenly over the entire period, 
whereas in the case of forward linkages there is a distinct shift in the mid-1990s where 
the linkages of services rise significantly. This may be indicative of the increasing 
‘maturity’ of the services sector, and could also be related to composition changes 
within services. 
The total forward linkages and total backward linkages of the economy (which are of 
course equal) and coefficient of interdependence of the economy have also risen 
significantly since the late 1990s. This is especially surprising in the context of the 
increasing openness of the economy during this period. These trends might be positive 
in terms of the degree of internal integration and ‘depth’ of the economy. Further 
research could investigate these issues in greater detail. 
The key empirical results emerging from this analysis of linkages and multipliers in the 
South African economy can be summarized as follows. Manufacturing uses more inputs 
from services (as intermediate inputs in manufacturing production), than the other way 
around. This holds whether or not imported intermediate inputs are excluded. Even 
when weighted for the relative size of the two sectors, the backward linkages from 
manufacturing to upstream services are stronger than from services to upstream 
manufacturing. This points to the importance of manufacturing as a source of demand 
for services. It also suggests that the costs and quality of services (that form 
intermediate inputs into manufacturing) are important for the competitiveness of 
manufacturing. Factoring in both direct and indirect backward linkages, an additional 
unit of final demand for manufacturing would require significantly more additional 
input from services than the other way around. Similarly for the economy as a whole, an 
additional unit of final demand for manufacturing would require more inputs than would 
an additional unit of services. 
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Figure 15: Direct backward linkage vectors 
1980-2005, manufacturing and services  
Figure 16: Total backward linkage vectors 
1980-2005, manufacturing and services  
 
 
Figure 17: Direct forward linkage vectors 1980-
2005, manufacturing and services 
 
Figure 18: Total forward linkage vectors 1980-
2005, manufacturing and services 
Figures 15-18 all in constant prices. Note that the y-axis does not start from zero. 
These results are consistent with those from the analysis of forward linkages. In 
particular, manufacturing is more important as a source of demand for the output of the 
services sector than is services as a source of demand for the manufacturing sector. This 
holds whether or not imported intermediates are excluded. This is a striking result, 
particularly in the light of the greater size of the services sector relative to 
manufacturing. 
These findings could suggest that manufacturing could have greater ‘pulling power’ on 
services than the other way around. In terms of economy-wide multipliers, an additional 
unit of final demand for manufacturing would require greater inputs from other sectors 
than is the case for services, suggesting that growth (decline) in manufacturing would 
have a greater stimulatory (contractionary) effect on the economy as a whole than an 
equal increase in final demand for services. Of course, this focuses only on growth-
enhancing effects through intersectoral linkages; in assessing the overall potential of a 
sector for stimulatory/contractionary effects of the economy other channels would also 
need to be factored in, for example through the balance of payments. 
In terms of economy-wide total forward linkages, and factoring in both direct and 
indirect effects, the increase in total production that would be required to fully utilize an 
additional unit of primary input are roughly similar for manufacturing and services.    25
The strength of the backward linkages from manufacturing to services (or the forward 
linkages from services to manufacturing) indicates that the cost and quality of service 
inputs into manufacturing are crucial for the competitiveness of manufacturing. Further, 
there is an asymmetry between manufacturing and services in terms of the possibilities 
of substituting imported inputs for domestically produced inputs – given that 
manufacturing is (in general) more tradable than services, it is easier for services to 
switch to imported manufacturing inputs than for manufacturing to switch to imported 
services inputs. This further underscores the importance of the cost and quality of 
(domestic) service inputs into manufacturing.  
It is also worth noting that the amount that the manufacturing sector spends on service 
inputs far exceeds the total wage bill of the manufacturing sector. In 2005 (current 
prices), manufacturing spent R186 billion on intermediate inputs from domestically 
produced services and R118 billion in remuneration. This puts in perspective arguments 
around the importance of manufacturing wages for competitiveness – while the level of 
manufacturing wages is of course important for the competitiveness of the sector, the 
cost and quality of inputs sourced from services are likely to be at least as important.17  
Considering the trends in backward and forward linkages from 1980 onwards, both the 
direct and total backward linkages of manufacturing are significantly stronger than 
those of services for the entire period. Services does appear to be beginning to catch up 
with manufacturing in terms of direct linkages. 
A different picture emerges regarding employment multipliers (not shown here due to 
space constraints). Ominously for the potential for employment creation – particularly 
with respect to the employment-creating potential of economic growth – the 
employment multipliers of both manufacturing and services have been falling over time. 
The total employment multiplier of services is higher than that of manufacturing 
throughout the period, and further that of manufacturing has declined more rapidly than 
has the total employment multiplier of services. 
6 Conclusions 
This paper has investigated the manufacturing and services sectors in South Africa, with 
a focus on the relationship between these two sectors and between each of them and the 
rest of the economy. The (private) services sector accounts for over half of South 
African GDP and this share continues to rise, while the share of manufacturing has 
slowly declined over the past two and a half decades from a peak of 22 per cent to about 
18 per cent at present.18 The level of labour productivity in manufacturing outstrips that 
in services and continues to rise, a development that is probably at least in part related 
to the capital intensification of manufacturing (although services is also surprisingly 
capital-intensive). One way of understanding the differing employment performances of 
the manufacturing and services sectors is that in services the growth of value added has 
significantly outstripped that of productivity, whereas in manufacturing productivity 
growth has exceeded growth in value added, particularly over the past decade. 
                                                 
17  Wages in the services sector would also be germane to the cost of inputs from services into 
manufacturing, yet wages do not account for the bulk of costs in services.  
18  Real annual growth in manufacturing over the period 1970-2005 was 2.6 per cent, and 3.5 per cent 
for (private) services.   26
These changes in the sectoral composition of the South African economy and differing 
characteristics are relevant for growth and employment. Heterodox and ‘classical’ 
development economics approaches have typically focused on the ‘special 
characteristics’ of manufacturing for a country’s growth and development, suggesting 
that it has a particular role to play as an engine of sustainable growth. Growth-
generating properties attributed to manufacturing include learning by doing and 
increasing returns to scale, strong linkages with the rest of the economy, technological 
progressiveness, and mitigating balance of payments constraints.  
This would imply that a unit of value added is not equivalent across sectors in terms of 
potential to drive and sustain growth. A decline in manufacturing – even if replaced by 
services – could have negative effects on South Africa’s medium- to long-term growth 
and employment prospects, the former directly and the latter primarily indirectly. To the 
extent that there has been deindustrialization in South Africa – specifically in terms of a 
relative decline in manufacturing employment – a key question is whether this process 
can be regarded as premature (given our level of income per capita), in the sense of 
foregoing potential benefits of further manufacturing growth. 
Going deeper into the sector ‘non-neutrality’ of growth, the paper proposes a conceptual 
template for thinking through the various ways in which sectoral growth can bring about 
additional overall economic growth. These channels are as follows: a sector’s backward 
linkages to domestic upstream sectors; a sector’s forward linkages to domestic 
downstream sectors; sectoral growth that brings about a growth-inducing change in the 
sectoral composition of the economy; increased division of labour and specialization; 
trade, notably if a sector is a net generator of foreign exchange; the growth-inducing or 
growth-complementing effects of sectoral employment; innovation, technological 
progress, and productivity growth (both internally to the sector and through its 
contributions to the broader economy); savings of a sector, which can finance 
productive investment elsewhere in the economy; the net fiscal contribution associated 
with sectoral growth; and institutional effects of sectoral growth, which may be more 
broadly growth-inducing or supporting.  
The purpose of theoretically mapping out these channels of sectoral contributions to 
overall growth is to provide a basis for analysing the differential contributions of 
different sectors of the South African economy (with a particular interest in 
manufacturing and services). Based on this approach, an identification of what the 
primary constraints on growth are at any particular conjuncture can allow for the 
prioritization of sectors that are especially relevant to inducing or supporting growth in 
relation to that constraint. This paper does not comprehensively investigate each of the 
channels or test each of the special characteristics associated with manufacturing – 
which would be a mammoth task – but does hone in on some key areas. 
Analysis of the backward and forward linkages between sectors revealed interesting 
results in terms of the way different sectors depend on each other for inputs as well as a 
market for their intermediate outputs. An important methodological step undertaken in 
this analysis is the exclusion of imported intermediate inputs, which is often overlooked 
in empirical work of this nature leading to misleading results. Manufacturing is found to 
be more important as a source of demand for services, than the other way around. This 
significant result might suggest that manufacturing has greater ‘pulling power’ on 
services than the other way around. In terms of economy-wide multipliers, an additional 
unit of final demand for manufacturing would require more inputs from other sectors   27
than is the case for services, suggesting that growth in manufacturing would have a 
greater stimulatory effect on the economy as a whole than an equal increase in final 
demand for services. Conversely, decline in the manufacturing sector would deprive the 
services sector of an important source of demand, both direct and indirect. The costs and 
quality of service inputs into manufacturing would be important for the productivity and 
competitiveness of manufacturing, but less important as a source of demand or driver of 
growth. 
Manufacturing remains critically important for growth in South Africa. In particular, as 
a source of demand for other sectors, which is important for pulling along growth in the 
rest of the economy. However, manufacturing is currently failing to absorb sufficient 
labour to seriously dent unemployment in South Africa. Employment creation has 
lagged far behind growth, such that unemployment remains at crisis proportions.19 Even 
factoring in its indirect contributions the employment-creating potential of 
manufacturing growth is lower than that of services per unit of final demand, based on 
current patterns.  
The potential growth-driving properties of manufacturing – such as increasing returns to 
scale – are likely to only be fully operative when manufacturing grows at a faster rate 
than has been the case in South Africa. In other words, the role of manufacturing as a 
growth engine may only really kick-in in a meaningful way above a certain level of 
manufacturing growth, and thereafter at an increasing rate (up to a certain point). 
Although this is difficult to assess empirically, it would be consistent with both 
theoretical perspectives and international empirical evidence. This would suggest that 
the acceleration of growth in the manufacturing sector could enhance its growth-pulling 
effects on the rest of the economy. 
Services are unlikely to be central in driving growth in South Africa, but are critical for 
labour absorption. The relatively low share of unskilled labour in services is however 
surprising, and it would be important for services to play a much more significant role 
in ‘mopping up’ unemployed unskilled workers. Services in many developing countries 
are far more important as an ‘employer of last resort’ than is the case in South Africa. 
This may be related in part to political economy considerations and the racialized 
character of the South African labour market, which may lead to ‘underemployment’ in 
interpersonal services in particular. 
There is a potential trade-off between sectors that are highly productive, technologically 
progressive, etc.; and those which are more labour absorbing, less productive, with a 
limited range of factor substitution possibilities towards capital, and so on. To some 
extent this is an inherent trade-off, as certain of the ‘progressive’ characteristics – such 
as technological progressivity and factor substitution potential – render them less likely 
to be prime employment creators, at least directly. Of course, this is not a simple 
dichotomy. Especially when indirect effects are factored in, a ‘progressive’ yet not 
particularly labour-absorbing sector can make an important contribution to employment 
creation through ‘growth-pulling’ effects on high-employment sectors. 
                                                 
19  Currently at 25.5 per cent using the narrow (official) definition, and 37.3 per cent using the broad 
definition.   28
The manufacturing sector is generally regarded in the literature as relatively dynamic, 
highly productive, with the greatest potential for benefits from economies of scale, the 
most rapid technological progress on balance, and with the most potential for capital-
intensifying factor substitution. While these qualities may be conducive to high growth, 
they are not necessarily conducive to employment creation (or at least to direct 
employment creation). On the other hand, services are generally more labour-intensive, 
with relatively lower scope for capital-intensifying factor substitution and technological 
progress. Even if sectors with these types of characteristics are not particularly growth-
dynamic, they may be extremely important from an employment perspective. 
Such trade-offs are not only at the intersectoral level, but also within sectors given the 
heterogeneity of subsectors. Although it may sound trite, an important point that 
emerges from this research is the importance of subsectoral analysis. Great 
heterogeneity is relevant in both the manufacturing and services sectors. Both 
manufacturing and services include subsectors that are capital-intensive and labour-
intensive, technologically progressive and less so, those that are primarily growth-
generating and those that are primarily labour-absorbing, and so on. Nevertheless, there 
are important commonalities within the manufacturing and services groupings 
respectively. 
Service subsectors such as ICT are highly technologically progressive, both internally 
and for other sectors, and have significant growth-inducing or at least growth-
supporting potential, yet are highly capital-intensive. Other service sectors such as 
domestic work are highly labour-absorbing (in a direct sense), yet would have 
extremely limited growth-inducing potential. Such trade-offs are only partly associated 
with the intrinsic characteristics of different sectors, and are subject at least in part to 
policy interventions – for example around the relative factor intensity of a sector, the 
nature of technological progress, and so on.  
The potential ‘growth-employment’ trade-off identified is at least in part mitigated in 
the South African case to the extent that the current level of unemployment is itself a 
constraint on growth. As discussed in section 3, employment creation is one of the 
channels through which sectoral growth can actually contribute to overall growth over 
and above that sectoral growth. Higher domestic demand derived from employment 
creation, as well as the mitigation of the destabilizing effects and other negative 
externalities associated with high levels of unemployment, means that employment 
creation can in itself raise growth. Nevertheless, as shown in this paper the 
manufacturing and services sectors in South Africa do contribute differentially to 
growth and to employment, suggesting that some difficult choices are called for in 
industrial and other policies. 
Sectoral characteristics as discussed in this paper are partly intrinsic to the nature of the 
sectors but are also partly reflective of past policies as well as subject to future policies. 
Clarification of these issues is not only analytically interesting but is also highly 
relevant from a policy perspective, in terms of where we should look to for future 
economic growth and employment creation, and what policy interventions might be 
required in this regard.    29
Appendix 1: Derivation of linkage coefficients and multipliers 
Let F(nxn) ≡ the intermediate input flow matrix, which shows the inputs from and to each 
of the sectors (inputs from the factors of production and excluding final outputs). fij is 
the value of the intermediate inputs flowing from sector i to sector j, i.e. the payment for 
intermediate inputs that flows from sector j to sector i. 
X(nx1) ≡ the total output flow vector, where xi is the total output of sector i (the sum of 
intermediate and final output). 
DIAG(X)(nxn)  ≡ a diagonal matrix where DIAG(x)ij = xij for all i=j, DIAG(x)ij  = 0 
otherwise. 
Y(nx1) ≡ the intermediate output flow vector, where yi is the intermediate output of sector 
i (that is, output which goes as intermediate inputs into other sectors). 
DIAG(Y)(nxn)  ≡ a diagonal matrix where DIAG(y)ij = yij for all i=j, DIAG(y)ij  = 0 
otherwise. 
I(nxn) = identity matrix and 1(nx1) = unity column vector 
 
then D (nxn)  ≡  FDIAG(Y)















E(nxn)  ≡ DIAG(Y)















-1 is the input coefficient matrix or the technical coefficient matrix in 
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Ã(nxn) is the weighted input coefficient matrix, weighted by the relative size of the input 





















= . This shows the strength of forward linkages adjusted 
for the relative size of the upstream sector. 
B(nxn) ≡ DIAG(X)








() nxn B %  is the weighted output coefficient matrix, weighted by the relative size of the 














= = . This shows the strength of forward linkages 
adjusted for the relative size of the downstream sector. 
Z  ≡ ( I – A)
-1, the input inverse or Leontief inverse, is a matrix of technical input 
coefficients that show intermediate inputs as a share of all inputs (including the value   30
added components). zij is the value of the additional output that would be required from 
the i
th sector to produce the necessary inputs for one unit of final demand of the j
th 
sector. The j






is the total increase in output that would be required to 
supply the necessary inputs for an initial unit in increase in sector j.20 Z thus represents 
the effects of expansion on suppliers. It is a measure of backward linkages. 
W ≡ (I – B)
-1, the output inverse, is a matrix of technical output coefficients, which each 
measure output which is sold as intermediate inputs into other sectors as a share of total 
sales (including final demand of consumers). wij is the increase in output of the j
th sector 
that would fully utilize the increased output from an initial unit of primary input into 
sector i. The i






 is the total increase in output that would fully utilize the 
increased output from an initial unit of primary input into sector i.21 W represents the 
effect of an expansion on users, and is a measure of forward linkages. 
L
DF
(1xn) ≡ B1 is the direct forward linkage vector. (This of course equals the row sums of 
the output coefficient matrix B.) For each sector i, this vector shows the direct forward 
linkages with downstream sectors. The direct forward linkage vector of each sector i is a 
weighted sum of direct forward linkages to downstream industries (with the weighting 




(nx1) ≡ 1´A is the direct backward linkage vector. (This of course equals the column 
sums of the output coefficient matrix A.) For each sector j, this vector shows the direct 
backward linkages with upstream sectors. As above, the direct forward linkage vector of 
each sector j is a weighted sum of its backward linkages. 
L
TF
(1xn) ≡ W1 is the total (direct and indirect) forward linkage vector. (This of course 
equals the row sums of the output inverse W.) For each sector i, this vector shows the 
direct and indirect forward linkages with downstream sectors. 
L
TB
(nx1) ≡ 1´Z is the total (direct and indirect) backward linkage vector. (This of course 
equals the column sums of the Leontief inverse W.) For each sector j, this vector shows 
the direct and indirect backward linkages with upstream sectors.  
Given that the forward linkage vector of each sector is a weighted sum of that sectors 
backward linkages (and vice versa), aggregate weighted forward linkages equal 
aggregate weighted backward linkages (with weighting being the value of each sector’s 
output). That is, X´L
TF = L
TBX. 
The economy-wide coefficient of interdependence can then be obtained as an output-
weighted average of either of these measures, that is, C ≡ X´L
TF ÷ X´1 = L
TBX ÷ X´1. 
                                                 
20 The  ith row sum of Z represents the increase in output of sector i that would be required to supply the 
inputs necessary for a one unit increase in final demand from all n sectors. This is not a relevant 
figure as the size of sectors varies considerably and hence an equal increase in final demand across 
the board is unrealistic. 
21 The  jth column sum of W shows the effect of a one unit expansion of primary inputs into all n 
sectors. As with the row sums of Z, this is not particularly relevant as an equal expansion across all 
sectors is unrealistic.   31
This measures the degree of ‘internal integration’ or ‘industrial depth’ at any point in 
time. 
All of the above vectors and matrices were also calculated using an adjusted 
intermediate input flow matrix F ˆ  that excludes imported intermediate inputs. Following 
all the above steps, all vectors and matrices can be derived adjusting such that the 
intermediate inputs on which they are based are only domestically produced. We thus 
derived the imported adjusted upstream linkages coefficient matrix (D ˆ ), upstream 
linkages coefficient matrix (E ˆ ), input coefficient matrix ( A ˆ ), weighted input coefficient 
matrix ( A ˆ ~ ), output coefficient matrix (B ˆ ), weighted input coefficient matrix (B ˆ ~), input 
inverse (Z ˆ ), output inverse (W ˆ ), direct forward linkage vector ( DF L ˆ ), direct backward 
linkage vector ( DB L ˆ ), total forward linkage vector (
TF L ˆ ), total backward linkage vector 
(
TB L ˆ ), and coefficient of integration  Cˆ .  
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Appendix 2: Linkages and multipliers – tables of results  
The following sets of tables show the results for all sectors of the various calculations of forward and backward linkages and multipliers, 
according to the methods set out in Appendix 1 and as discussed in section 5. The calculations have also been undertaken for the more 
disaggregated 43-sector structure, but are shown here at the 9-sector level for the sake of brevity. 
Table A1: Backward linkages in terms of total output 
 
 
Agriculture Mining Manufacturing  EGW  Construction Trade Transport Finance  CSP  Government
Services 
total 
Agriculture 2.4  0.0 4.9  0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.1 
Mining 0.7  0.5  10.8  16.0  4.3 0.0 0.2  0.2  0.3  0.3  0.2 
Manufacturing   31.1  15.2  38.4  7.9 33.9  9.0  21.2  7.1  14.5  10.2 11.8 
EGW  1.0  2.3 1.2 15.7 0.3  1.1 1.4  0.6  1.1  0.4  1.0 
Construction 0.3  0.6  0.0  3.4  19.0 0.9 0.4  1.2  0.6  0.8  0.9 
Trade   6.0  2.6  7.2  2.0  4.1 6.2 8.7  4.0  6.1  2.9  6.0 
Transport 7.6  21.9  3.8 1.7  2.1 10.4 14.3  5.4  4.2  3.4  8.7 
Finance 2.8  2.6  6.3  5.3  8.2 17.9  8.1  23.7  19.1  5.3  18.0 
CSP 2.6  1.3  1.4  0.0  0.3  0.3 0.4  1.5  2.1  3.6  1.0 
Government   0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0  0.1  0.9  4.7  0.1 
Services total  18.9  28.4  18.7  9.0 14.6  34.9  31.5  34.7  31.5  15.1 33.6 
SUM 54.5  47.0  74.1  52.0  72.1  46.1 54.6  43.9  48.8  31.6  47.6 
 
This is the input coefficient matrix A. The last row is the direct backward linkage vector L
DB.  
EGW = electricity, gas, and water; CSP = community, social, and personal services.   33
Table A2: Backward linkages in terms of total output, import adjusted 
 
 Agriculture  Mining  Manufacturing  EGW  Construction Trade Transport  Finance CSP Government
Services 
total 
Agriculture 2.2  0.0  4.5  0.0  0.0 0.2 0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.1 
Mining 0.4  0.4  6.1  14.9  2.1 0.0 0.1  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.1 
Manufacturing   22.5  9.4  27.8  5.2 25.7  7.3  12.9  5.1  9.2  6.5  8.0 
EGW 1.0  2.3  1.2  15.6  0.3  1.1 1.4  0.6  1.1  0.4  1.0 
Construction 0.4  0.7  0.0  4.0  22.1 1.3 0.5  1.6  0.8  0.8  1.2 
Trade   6.0  2.6  7.2  1.9  3.8 6.1 8.6  3.9  6.0  2.8  5.9 
Transport 6.9  19.9  3.5  1.5  1.8 9.9  13.6  5.1  4.0  3.1  8.2 
Finance 2.7  2.5  6.0  5.1  7.3 17.2  7.8  23.0  18.1  4.9  17.3 
CSP 2.5  1.4  1.5  0.0  0.3  0.3 0.4  1.5  2.3  3.5  1.0 
Government   0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0  0.8  7.4  0.1 
Services total  18.2  26.4  18.2  8.5 13.2  33.5  30.4  33.5  30.5  14.3 32.4 
SUM 44.7  39.2  57.8  48.3  63.4  43.4 45.3  41.1  42.6  29.7  42.9 
 
This is the import-adjusted input coefficient matrix  A ˆ , and the last row is the import-adjusted direct backward linkage vector 
DB L ˆ .   34
Table A3: Input inverse (Leontief inverse) and total backward linkage vector 
 
 Agriculture  Mining  Manufacturing  EGW  Construction Trade  Transport Finance  CSP  Government 
Services 
total 
Agriculture 1.06  0.02  0.09  0.02  0.04 0.02  0.03  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.02 
Mining 0.09  1.06  0.21  0.23  0.15  0.04 0.07  0.03 0.05  0.04  0.05 
Manufacturing   0.68  0.43  1.86  0.32  0.86 0.30  0.53  0.25  0.38  0.27  0.35 
EGW 0.03  0.04  0.04  1.20  0.03  0.03 0.03  0.02 0.03  0.01  0.03 
Construction 0.01  0.02 0.01  0.06 1.24 0.02  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.01  0.02 
Trade   0.15  0.10  0.19  0.08  0.16 1.12  0.17  0.09  0.13  0.07   
Transport 0.18  0.32  0.19  0.12  0.15 0.18  1.25  0.12  0.12  0.08   
Finance 0.17  0.14  0.24  0.16  0.27 0.32  0.23  1.38  0.34  0.14   
CSP 0.04  0.03  0.04  0.01  0.02  0.01 0.02  0.03 1.03  0.05   
Government   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0.01  1.05   
Services total  0.54  0.58  0.65  0.37  0.60 1.64  1.67  1.62  1.62  0.34  1.64 
SUM 2.41  2.16  2.87  2.20  2.93  2.04 2.33  1.97 2.12  1.73  2.10 
 
The last row is the total backward linkage vector.   35
 
Table A4: Import-adjusted input inverse and total backward linkage vector 
 
 Agriculture  Mining  Manufacturing  EGW  Construction Trade  Transport Finance  CSP Government
Services 
total 
Agriculture 1.04  0.01  0.07  0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01 
Mining 0.03  1.02  0.10  0.19  0.06  0.02 0.02  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.02 
Manufacturing   0.38  0.21  1.48  0.17  0.52 0.18 0.26  0.14  0.19  0.14  0.19 
EGW 0.02  0.04  0.03  1.20  0.02  0.02 0.03  0.02  0.02  0.01  0.02 
Construction 0.01  0.02 0.01  0.07  1.29 0.03 0.02  0.03  0.02  0.02  0.02 
Trade   0.12  0.08  0.14  0.06  0.11 1.11 0.14  0.08  0.10  0.06   
Transport 0.13  0.26  0.12  0.09  0.09 0.16 1.20  0.10  0.09  0.06   
Finance 0.12  0.10  0.17  0.13  0.21 0.28 0.18  1.35  0.30  0.11   
CSP 0.04  0.02  0.03  0.01  0.02  0.01 0.01  0.02  1.03  0.04   
Government   0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.01  1.08  0.00 
Services total  0.40  0.46  0.46  0.29  0.43 1.56 1.54  1.55  1.52  0.28  1.55 
SUM 1.89  1.76  2.14  1.92  2.35  1.82 1.87  1.76  1.80  1.54  1.81 
 
The last row is the import-adjusted total backward linkage vector.   36
Table A5: Forward linkages in terms of total output 
 
 Agriculture  Mining  Manufacturing  EGW  Construction Trade Transport  Finance CSP Government 
Services 
total SUM 
Agriculture 2.40  0.04  63.12 0.01  0.01  0.98 0.00 0.05  0.21 0.23  1.24  67.06 
Mining 0.30  0.45  61.66  5.83  3.44  0.03 0.31 0.61  0.24 0.53  1.18  73.40 
Manufacturing  2.39 2.67  38.43  0.51  4.79 3.22  6.58 3.53  2.36  3.21  15.69  67.70 
EGW 1.26  6.37  19.43  15.75  0.63  6.13 6.79 5.05  2.76 1.86  20.73  66.02 
Construction 0.18  0.80  0.01  1.52 19.04 2.33 0.77 4.34  0.64 1.77  8.08  31.40 
Trade   1.28  1.27  20.04  0.36  1.62  6.22 7.55 5.61  2.79 2.51  22.17  49.26 
Transport 1.88  12.38  12.27  0.34  0.95  12.07 14.25  8.76  2.20  3.41  37.27 68.51 
Finance 0.43  0.92  12.69  0.68  2.31  12.89 5.02  23.75  6.22 3.34  47.88  68.25 
CSP 1.20  1.45  8.50  0.01  0.22  0.59 0.81 4.47  2.05 6.92  7.92  26.23 
Government 0  0  0  0  0  0  0.03  0.09  0.47  4.75  0.59  5.34 
Services total  1.09  3.75  14.06  0.43  1.55 9.40  7.34  13.01  3.85  3.57 33.59  58.05 
 
This is the output coefficient matrix B. The final column is the direct forward linkage vector L
DF.   37
Table A6: Forward linkages in terms of total output, import adjusted 
 
  Agriculture Mining Manufacturing  EGW  Construction  Trade Transport Finance  CSP  Government
Services 
total SUM 
Agriculture 2.21  0.03  58.25  0.01  0.01  0.91 0.00  0.04 0.20  0.21  1.16  61.89 
Mining 0.16  0.36  34.72  5.42  1.69  0.02 0.17  0.52 0.17  0.34  0.88  43.58 
Manufacturing 1.73  1.65  27.82  0.33  3.64  2.62 4.00  2.53 1.51  2.12  10.65  47.95 
EGW 1.26  6.34  19.39  15.65  0.59  6.16 6.80  5.03 2.79  1.93  20.79  65.95 
Construction 0.22  0.83  0.01  1.82  22.07  3.25 1.02  5.74 0.87  1.91  10.88  37.74 
Trade   1.28  1.27  20.02  0.35  1.50  6.14 7.42  5.43 2.74  2.52  21.73  48.67 
Transport 1.72  11.29  11.29 0.31  0.83  11.42 13.63  8.25  2.09  3.29  35.39  64.13 
Finance 0.42  0.87  12.05  0.65  2.06  12.33 4.84  22.97 5.92  3.21  46.06  65.33 
CSP 1.18  1.49  8.91  0.01  0.22  0.67 0.83  4.60 2.29  7.03  8.39  27.23 
Government   0  0  0  0  0  0  0.03  0.07  0.40  7.39  0.50  7.90 
Services total  1.05  3.48  13.64  0.41  1.40 9.02  7.10  12.57  3.73  3.51 32.41  55.90 
 
This is the import-adjusted output coefficient matrixB ˆ . The final column is the import-adjusted direct forward linkage vector  ˆDF L .   38
Table A7: Output inverse (W) and total forward linkage vector (L
TF) 
 
  Agriculture Mining Manufacturing  EGW  Construction Trade  Transport  Finance CSP Government
Services 
total SUM 
Agriculture 1.06  0.05 1.21  0.01 0.08  0.08 0.11 0.08  0.04  0.06  0.31  2.79 
Mining 0.04  1.06  1.20  0.08  0.12  0.08 0.12 0.10  0.05  0.06  0.34  2.92 
Manufacturing 0.05  0.08  1.86  0.02  0.12  0.11 0.16 0.13  0.06  0.08  0.46  2.67 
EGW 0.04  0.12  0.66  1.20  0.06  0.15 0.17 0.15  0.07  0.07  0.53  2.69 
Construction 0.01 0.02  0.08  0.03  1.24 0.05 0.03 0.08  0.02  0.03  0.18  1.59 
Trade   0.03  0.05  0.52  0.01  0.06  1.12 0.15 0.13  0.06  0.06  1.46  2.20 
Transport 0.04  0.18  0.60 0.02  0.07  0.21 1.25 0.20  0.06  0.08  1.72  2.72 
Finance 0.03  0.05  0.49  0.02  0.08  0.23 0.14 1.38  0.11  0.09  1.86  2.60 
CSP 0.02  0.03  0.22  0.00  0.02  0.03 0.04 0.08  1.03  0.09  1.18  1.56 
Government   0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.01  1.05  0.01  1.06 
Services total  0.03  0.08  0.49  0.02 0.06          0.08 1.64  2.39 
 
The last column is the total forward linkage vector.   39
Table A8: Import-adjusted output inverse (W ˆ ) and total forward linkage vector (
TF L ˆ ) 
 
  Agriculture Mining Manufacturing  EGW  Construction  Trade Transport Finance  CSP  Government
Services 
total SUM 
Agriculture 1.04  0.02  0.88 0.01  0.04  0.05 0.05  0.04  0.02  0.03  0.16  2.19 
Mining 0.01  1.02  0.55  0.07  0.05  0.03 0.04  0.04  0.02  0.02  0.13  1.85 
Manufacturing   0.03  0.04  1.48  0.01  0.07 0.06  0.08  0.07  0.03 0.05  0.25  1.92 
EGW 0.03  0.10  0.48  1.20  0.04  0.13 0.14  0.12  0.06  0.05  0.44  2.35 
Construction 0.01  0.02 0.07  0.03 1.29  0.07 0.03  0.11  0.02  0.04  0.23  1.69 
Trade   0.02  0.04  0.39  0.01  0.04  1.11 0.12  0.11  0.05  0.05  1.39  1.95 
Transport 0.03  0.15  0.37  0.02  0.04  0.18 1.20  0.16  0.05  0.07  1.59  2.27 
Finance 0.02  0.04  0.35  0.02  0.06  0.20 0.11  1.35  0.10  0.07  1.76  2.31 
CSP 0.02  0.02  0.18  0.00  0.01  0.03 0.02  0.07  1.03  0.09  1.16  1.48 
Government   0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00  1.08  0.01  1.09 
Services total  0.02  0.06  0.34  0.01 0.05         0.07 1.55  2.10 
 
The last column is the import-adjusted total forward linkage vector. 
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